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In this paper I will explore the possibility that Horacio Quiroga’s regional 
treatment of modernist themes is more than a creole adaptation or mimicry of the 
European maestros, instead placing Quiroga in dialogue with an international framework 
of contemporary texts that explore conflicting attitudes towards modernity through dark 
portrayals of science and technology. I focus on Quiroga’s 1910 novella El hombre 
artificial (The Artificial Man), a text with an amalgamation of themes and plot devices 
that have caused the work itself to be dismissed for being of “poor quality.” Yet these 
themes and formal features integrally connect Quiroga’s novella to a European social and 
literary tradition.  
I will focus my inquiry on the image of the automaton—an artificial or 
constructed human being that appears throughout Western literature, but becomes 
especially prevalent in modernist literature. By examining parallel treatments of the 
automaton by European authors Sigmund Freud and Karel Čapek, I will demonstrate that 
Quiroga belongs to an international conversation which utilizes the automaton to draw 
attention to the common nature of these concerns and preoccupations evident in both 
canonical and marginal modernist literature. This comparative study of different 
portrayals of the automaton will thus complicate attempts to view modernist literature as 
a unified whole or single narrative. Labeling Quiroga a mere “predecessor” of Latin 
American magical realism or imitator of European maestros is to remove him to a sphere 
separate from European modernism in order to preserve a coherent approach to a 
heterogeneous topic. We should instead utilize a comparison of these representations of 
 iii 
automata to enhance our understanding of a complex, nuanced transnational modernism 
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Quiroga and “Regional” Literature 
 
Although his gruesome and gritty stories of life, death and the unpredictability of 
nature in both rural and urban Argentina speak to universal themes common to modernist 
literature, the scholarly community largely—and incorrectly—labels Horacio Quiroga 
(1878-1937) a regional author. The study of his work, generally limited to the fields of 
Latin American or Spanish literature, acknowledges his short stories as provocative 
meditations on the uncontrollable nature of the jungle and man’s unsuitability for rural 
life. Quiroga, however, was an active participant in the literary discourses of his 
contemporary authors, including authors of the “aesthetic” European modernism from 
which he is frequently excluded. The author’s dialogue with authors such as Karel Čapek 
and Sigmund Freud demonstrates the necessity of a nuanced understanding of 
modernism. To locate Quiroga within an international framework of contemporary texts 
that explore conflicting attitudes towards modernity through dark portrayals of science 
and technology is to critique an understanding of modernist literature as a monolithic 
“modernism” ruled by a few canonical European authors. 
I will focus my inquiry on the image of the automaton—an artificial or 
constructed human being that appears throughout Western literature, but becomes 
especially prevalent in European literature of the late 1800s and eventually flourishes in 
twentieth-century science fiction literature. The literary figure of the automaton has the 
ability to reflect a multitude of societal preoccupations, condensing conflicting reactions 
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to concerns about advancing technology, globalization, or the human psyche itself. By 
examining parallel treatments of the automaton by European authors, I will demonstrate 
that Quiroga is intentionally utilizing the trope to draw attention to the common nature of 
these concerns and preoccupations evident in both canonical and marginal modernist 
literature. This comparative study of different portrayals of the automaton will thus 
complicate attempts to view modernist literature as a unified whole or single narrative. 
Labeling Quiroga a mere “predecessor” of Latin American magical realism or imitator of 
European maestros is to remove him to a sphere separate from European modernism in 
order to preserve a coherent approach to a heterogeneous topic. We should instead utilize 
a comparison of these representations of automata to enhance our understanding of a 
complex, nuanced transnational modernism or modernisms that holds conversations 
across national borders. 
This multifaceted conception of modernism complicates any attempt to arrive at a 
single scholarly definition of the period or its literary features. Susan Stanford Friedman 
addresses the contradictions involved in the attempt to define “modernism” and its 
ground of study, concluding that these definitions are perhaps irreconcilable (497). In 
order to draw attention to Quiroga’s dialogue with his contemporary modernist authors, 
with whom he shared not only a temporal situation but also an interest in transnational 
motifs and preoccupations, I must attempt to define my notion of modernism. Thus, in 
this project I share Mia Carter and Alan Warren Friedman’s conception of “literary 
modernism” as a term that encompasses a wide range of texts published in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (approximately 1870-1939) and served to 
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interrogate, undermine or rupture the dominant trope of “progress” (2). Whether it took 
the form of the Victorian concepts and institutions of class and gender constraints, 
imperial colonialism, institutional Christianity or industrialism, progress was challenged 
by diverse modernist texts that utilized a variety of forms and common tropes. The figure 
of the automaton is merely one such symbol employed by modernist authors of Europe, 
Asia, the Americas and worldwide.  
This project must heed Jahan Ramazani’s warning that “to impose ‘modernism’ 
as an umbrella category…is to whitewash differences and tensions among peoples, 
continents, and histories, blandly assimilating them in an undifferentiated mass of 
twentieth- and twenty-first century ‘modernist’ cultures (353). Therefore, I aim to 
examine Quiroga’s unique contribution to this conversation, which is situated in a 
distinctly Argentine setting and culture yet is not limited in audience or impact to solely 
Latin America. His participation in the long tradition of automaton literature from the 
“peripheral” locale of Buenos Aires is, I argue, not an outlying anomaly but a 
representative event that supports the recent scholarly push towards a less Eurocentric 
conception of modernism (Mao and Walkowitz 739).     
Quiroga’s work that is most central to this understanding of modernism is the 
1910 novella El hombre artificial (The Artificial Man). This text, one of his earliest and 
one of only two novels that the prolific author produced, contains an amalgamation of 
themes and plot devices which have caused the work to be dismissed for being of “poor 
quality.” Yet these themes integrally connect Quiroga’s novella not only to the European 
modernist tradition from which he is generally excluded but also to a global modernist 
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conversation. In El hombre artificial, three scientists’ attempt to create a human being 
reflects on the modern period’s suspicion of new technology without providing a 
straightforward “Argentine” answer to any of the questions raised by this transnational 
issue.  
First published in the Argentine popular magazine Caras y Caretas between 
January and February 1910, El hombre artificial is a prototypical science fiction novella 
that utilizes the motif of the automaton to depict a complex and conflicted modern society 
whose borders stretch far beyond the geographical constraints of South America. The 
story, set in turn-of-the-century Buenos Aires, is a tale of the consequences of creating an 
automaton, which in the novella is referred to as a ser vivo or “human being.” This 
automaton is created through the scientific experimentations of three brilliant scientists of 
various specialties and nationalities, all of whom have relinquished ties to colonialism, 
institutional learning, or the socioeconomic elite. The group’s leader, Nicolas Ivanovich 
Donissoff, is a Russian who is descended from a noble family yet renounces the rule of 
the tsarists, his family name, and his inheritance in favor of the anarchist movement. 
Marco Sivel, a celebrated Italian doctor, renounces love and his medical license and 
replaces institutional marriage with marriage to his discipline and a heightened passion 
for anatomy. Ricardo Ortiz, the Argentine member of the cast, studies electrical 
engineering in the United States but renounces his family and his large inheritance in 
favor of tinkering with batteries and invention, and it is his work with electricity that 
ultimately allows for the animation of their experiment.  
The novella’s primary characters are initially elated by the seeming success of 
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their attempts to use modern science to create life. El hombre artificial begins with a tone 
of celebration; Donissoff, Sivel and Ortiz see three years of scientific labor and self-
deprivation come to fruition when they are able to create a rat by arranging its elements 
according to scientific patterns: “Su obra duro tres años. Carbono, hidrogeno, oxígeno, 
todos los elementos primordiales y constitutivos de la célula pasaron sucesivamente por 
la electrolisis de Ortiz, las direcciones de Sivel y los reactivos de Donissoff” [Their work 
lasted three years. Carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, all the primordial, constitutive cellular 
elements passed successively through Ortiz’s electrolysis, Sivel’s dissections, and 
Donissoff’s reagents] (Quiroga 28).1 They bring the rat to life, and although it lives for 
only a short time before expiring, the three scientists are successful in their endeavor to 
create an adult copy of a living organism without having to wait for the creation to 
mature or acquire logic and reason. The team is quickly able to isolate the error in the 
biological creation process that resulted in the rat’s premature death and proceed with the 
next stage of their ambitious plan: creating an adult human male with the capacity for 
language, rational thought and the cumulative knowledge of human experience. The rat, 
Donissoff explains to his colleagues, was given all of the required senses—nerve 
transmitters, a cerebral transmitter—but no perception. Donissoff requests the last word 
in precisely how the scientists will go about fine-tuning their creation and imbuing a new-
born man with the perception of an adult: a request which is granted. 
 Ten months later, in June of 1910, the team is able to produce an apparently 
                                                
1 All translations of El hombre artificial in this paper are my own, from the 1989 
Valdemar edition of Quiroga’s text. 
2 See, for example, David S. Hogsette’s “Metaphysical intersections in Frankenstein: 
Mary Shelley's theistic investigation of scientific materialism and transgressive 
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perfected human body from the same atomic process. They dub this automaton Biógeno, 
which means “I give life” but which they choose to mean “giver of life.” The height of 
scientific accomplishment has apparently been attained, and this team of men is able to 
achieve god-like status through the creation of artificial life. However, when it comes 
time for Donissoff to endow Biógeno with perception, he turns not to the familiar 
avenues of biology, chemistry or electrical engineering, but to a “transfer of sensation” 
between a kidnapped and apparently destitute denizen of Buenos Aires and the prone 
Biógeno. Their unwilling victim is strapped to a lab table and connected to the automaton 
before Donissoff removes his fingernails with a pair of pliers. The transfer of this man’s 
sensation is perhaps too successful, and the created man feels all of the tortured man’s 
pain and more: every sensation is amplified and excruciating. Instead of aborting the 
project and killing Biógeno as Sivel and Ortiz beg, Donissoff commands his colleagues to 
reverse the process, torturing Biógeno and transferring the excess sensation into 
Donissoff’s own body to release the excess sensation that plagues their creation.  
Thus Donissoff, and to a lesser extent Sivel and Ortiz, are presented as 
unrepentant scientific pioneers, willing to sacrifice love, money and health in their 
dedication to their potentially world-changing laboratory experiment. At the same time, 
the men represent the worst fears of a world inundated by new and frightening 
technologies that had yet to be held accountable to legal or culturally constructed 
restrictions. The three characters in Quiroga’s novella utilize their technological prowess 
without seeming to hold their scientific method accountable to any code of conduct—or 
at least not a code of conduct that would prohibit them from torturing another human 
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being in order to give perception to their creation.  
This project seeks to draw attention to common features between this automaton 
narrative and other modernist treatments of the trope. If we view the novella merely as 
Quiroga’s straightforward attempt to encourage a Latin American vision of technological 
progress—ignoring its dialogue with contemporary depictions of the automaton—we 
miss, I argue, this work’s criticism of a conception of a singular, European modernism 
surrounded but not impacted by peripheral, nationalist texts. Each of the texts studied in 
this paper—Austrian, Czech and Argentine alike—participate in the long literary 
tradition of discussion of the automaton, whether it takes the form of a clockwork robot, a 
realistic android or an artificially created human being formed from a mysterious organic 
element.  El hombre artificial converses with other automaton or robot literature of the 
period, echoing the fear of the rebel machines found in Čapek’s  R.U.R and concerns 
about human perception of the automaton in Freud’s “The Uncanny.” If we move past a 
reading of Quiroga’s use of themes and motifs as a regionalist appropriation of a 
maestro’s work, I believe that we might come to an understanding of a critique of a Euro-
centric understanding of modern literature. 
 
The Literary Automaton 
The long tradition of “creating” life has been thoroughly traced in both Eastern 
and Western literature and history, and while he serves as the crucible of El hombre 
artificial, the artificially crafted man is certainly not a character unique to Quiroga. The 
tradition of splicing together various human bits and pieces is easily traceable in the 
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myths and legends of several ancient cultures, and Bruce Mazlish’s comprehensive article 
“The Man-Machine and Artificial Intelligence” provides an overview of humanoid 
creations over the millennia. Greek myth contains Icarus’s wax wings and Hephaestus’ 
automated bronze guardian. Indian and Arabic mythology also touches on the artificially 
created man. Yet it is not merely myth, and the creative power is not solely the domain of 
gods: Chinese tradition, Mazlish claims, is rife with detailed descriptions of mechanized 
doves, automated cup-bearers and chariots that allegedly moved themselves as early as 
the third century BC. European mechanization came later, with thirteenth-century spring-
loaded birds and other automated devices explained as alchemy: “the ancient fascination 
with automata took on new life. Magic and mechanics were intertwined, and an air of 
fear and wonder hovered over the statues and angels conjured out of the earth and air: are 
they alive and real, or not?” (Mazlish). The ambiguity surrounding the veracity of the 
automaton’s “human” body fascinated authors.   
While by the eighteenth century, rational explanations had emerged for automated 
creatures such as Jacques de Vaucanson’s digesting duck and Pierre Jaquet-Droz’s 
clockwork child (a figure that functions to this day), these lifelike figures, despite their 
Enlightenment-era rationale, inspired—or perhaps reflected—a sense of unease in those 
who viewed them that has yet to be wholly eradicated. Mary Shelly’s 1818 novel 
Frankenstein, featuring the Promethean Dr. Frankenstein and his horrific creation, is 
perhaps the most famous example of the literary automaton. As one of the earliest 
canonical science fiction novels, this deployment of the motif is also one of the most 
frequently examined texts in the genre and its critics have been thorough in their 
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examinations of the implications of the created creature for Shelly and her 
contemporaries.2  
Though Shelly’s novel may have been the motif’s vanguard, the literary 
automaton of the early twentieth century was distinct from its predecessors in its cultural 
function. According to Tim Armstrong, literature served a meaning-making function 
during this era by attempting to process unfamiliar and frightening advances in science 
and technology vis-à-vis the corporeal form of humanity. Technology such as the x-ray 
and electrolysis, agents of change simultaneously celebrated and feared in this time 
period, began to be examined through the lens of the human body. The literary 
automaton, then, complicated the symbol of the human body as self-contained and 
autonomous by bringing into question its veracity; is the “human” body presented in a 
text real and trustworthy, or has technology “duped” readers into trusting an entirely 
inhuman creature? Readers were forced to examine their notions of technology’s effects 
on their definitions of humanity. 
 In the twentieth century and beyond, the human-like figure of the automaton has 
continued to inspire—or perhaps reflect—a sense of unease in its readers and viewers 
that science and design have yet to successfully eradicate. The progression of time and 
civilization has been reflected in the changing form of the automaton and the anxieties it 
represents. By the 1960s, for instance, the automaton came to be recognized as a symbol 
of subhumanity to an audience increasingly familiar with the figure of the automaton in 
                                                
2 See, for example, David S. Hogsette’s “Metaphysical intersections in Frankenstein: 
Mary Shelley's theistic investigation of scientific materialism and transgressive 
autonomy” or E.L Graham’s “Frankensteins and Cyborgs: Visions of the Global Future 
in an Age of Technology.” 
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literature and film, such as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), George Orwell’s 
1984 (1949) and Don Siegel’s Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), to the point where 
Scott Selisker claims that “the automaton would later become the cinematic and literary 
focal point for this anxiety” (579) about totalitarianism.. Many 1960s novels that 
participated in conversations about automata-related unrest, localized in the popularity of 
the cyborg and criticism of Norbert Wiener’s popular book God and Golem, in which he 
implied that a human who creates a cyborg capable of learning is essentially equivalent to 
God (Hong). This conversation, located largely in science fiction texts, drew the study of 
the motif of the automaton into contemporary literary criticism. 
The extended conversation about the automaton —which stretches from Greek 
mythology and ancient China to the American Civil Rights movement—and authors’ 
participation therein allows scholars to analyze changing concerns and preoccupations 
about themes such as technology and the human body across centuries. The study of 
literary modernism has certainly already endeavored to examine the motif of the 
automaton across works of literature in the “modernist canon.” These studies 
acknowledge that “canonical” texts such as Freud’s essay on the uncanny or Čapek’s 
R.U.R. reflect the uncertainties of the era. Marginalized texts such as Quiroga’s El 
hombre artificial, however, participate in the same attempt to condense societal 
preoccupations and fears through the motif of the automaton. An examination of these 
three texts’ deployments of this figure demonstrates Quiroga’s participation in and 
contribution to the transnational framework of automaton-related uncertainty and 
unsettling depictions of scientific progress. His depiction of the universal figure of the 
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automaton in a uniquely Latin American setting expands the scope of modernist studies 




FREUD’S UNCANNY AUTOMATON 
Most studies of the automaton touch on Sigmund Freud’s study of the motif. The 
term “uncanny,” used by many critics of the automaton, begs association with Freud’s 
well-known essay “The Uncanny,” in which the theorist agrees with the longstanding 
belief that something about the automaton rings discordant in the human psyche. The 
studies of scientist Ernst Jentsch, with which this essay converses, were among the first to 
describe man’s notion of the automaton as uncanny. The uncanny, Jentsch claims, can be 
evoked when a viewer has “doubts [as to] whether an apparently animate being is really 
alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object might not be in fact animate” such as “the 
impressions made by waxwork figures, ingeniously constructed dolls and automata” (qtd. 
in Freud 124). This psychological effect, then, may be produced by the automaton that 
appears too similar to a human being. 
Twenty-first century robotics expert Masahiro Mori expanded Jentsch’s theory 
into the world of design, cautioning artists and engineers about the public reaction to the 
uncanny nature of robots or other forms of automated artificial beings. Design a robot 
that seems too similar to a human in form or function, Mori warns, and it will engender a 
fear of human inadequacy. If a robot is aesthetically indistinguishable from a human 
being and can fulfill human tasks with greater ease or reliability, what is then left for the 
humans? Mori’s theory of the Uncanny Valley warned artists in the 1970s “not to design 
robots as too human-like, otherwise the robot would repel the human viewer and thus fall 
into the uncanny valley, a state of fear and disbelief” (Marynowsky).  
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In regards to literary study, Jentsch claimed that this feeling of discomfort 
produced by the automaton may be utilized by authors to produce certain feelings in their 
readership: 
One of the surest devices for producing slightly uncanny effects through 
story-telling is to leave the reader wondering whether a particular figure is 
a real person or an automaton, and to do so in such a way that his attention 
is not focused directly on the uncertainty, lest he should be prompted to 
examine and settle the matter for once, for in this way, as we have said, 
the special emotional effect can easily be dissipated. (qtd. in Freud 135)  
The cunning reader, according to Jentsch, might make rational inquiries into the nature of 
the literary automaton, discern whether or not it is actually human, and easily dissipate 
the discomfort of the uncanny feeling the automaton produces. The automaton, while 
unsettling, may be understood and dismissed as long as the reader is not left with 
questions about its status as a human being. 
Freud claims, however, that Jentsch’s foundational study of the automaton and the 
uncanny “does not go beyond relating the uncanny to the novel and the unfamiliar” (125). 
The automaton is not always going to be a cut-and-dry inhuman figure that falls into an 
easy categorization; it will not always be strictly unfamiliar. Freud thus attempts to revise 
Jentsch’s understanding of the uncanny through an exploration of figures that are both 
novel and familiar, whose very resistance to categorization produces the uncanny 
sensation. “The uncanny (das Unheimliche, ‘the unhomely’),” he claims, “is in some way 
a species of the familiar (das Heimliche, ‘the homely’)” (134). Each automaton produces 
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discomfort and uncertainty precisely because of its oxymoronic nature as a “man-made 
human,” and knowledge of its origins, processes or function may flesh out a story but 
does not mitigate the ambiguity and ambivalence that a reader or viewer experiences 
when faced with an automaton.  
Freud, then, disagreed with the notion that the uncanny could be conquered 
through rational thought or scientific study: “clear knowledge in no way diminishes the 
impression of the uncanny. The notion of intellectual uncertainty in no way helps us to 
understand this uncanny effect” (139). The doctor instead turns to his own theory of 
psychoanalysis to attempt to explain the irrational unease prompted by uncanny figures 
such as the automaton.  
Freud denounces scientific certainty’s place in an understanding of the automaton 
through an extended analysis of the clockwork doll Olimpia in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story 
of “The Sand Man” in Nachtstücken. While Olimpia is certainly an uncanny figure, who 
recurs several times throughout the tale to torment the protagonist into fits of madness, 
there exists no possibility in the reader’s mind that she is not a human being, as her 
clockwork limbs and eyes are clearly described. The reader does not mourn for the 
automaton when her eyes are removed. Freud is forced to question why the reader is still 
unbalanced by the story: “we, with the superiority of rational minds, are able to detect the 
sober truth; and yet this knowledge does not lessen the impression of uncanniness in the 
least degree. The theory of intellectual uncertainty is thus incapable of explaining that 
impression” (139). Freud concludes that there must be something in the reader that 
unconsciously reacts to one of the many emotions evoked by the living doll—not fear but 
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an infantile desire or belief in the possibility of a living doll—that produces a confusion 
of possibility/impossibility, familiar/unfamiliar.  
So an irrational emotional response of fright evoked by the literary automaton 
must, Freud claims, be a result of repressed fear that returns when faced with the figure of 
the automaton. This would explain the dual nature of the das Heimliche/das Unheimliche 
homely/unhomely etymology of the word: “for this uncanny element is actually nothing 
new or strange, but something that was long familiar to the psyche and was estranged 
from it only through being repressed” (148). To Freud, then, the challenge of the uncanny 
was the challenge of unearthing the mysterious “frightening element” that “has been 
repressed and now returns” (147), a challenge quite appropriate to the psychoanalytic 
miner of the subconscious.  
Freud’s automata do not depend merely on occult origins or intellectual 
uncertainty on the part of the readers to produce a sense of discomfort. They are instead 
objects onto which the reader’s psyche projects its own—often repressed—fears, desires, 
etc. Olimpia’s disconcerting effects remain even after the reader understands that she is 
made of clockwork and feels no pain. Yet even if the doll were sentient and the removal 
of her eyes and limbs did present a moral quandary, the sense of the uncanny would still 
pervade, as the reader’s situation would remain the cause of the sensation of 
“uncaniness.”  
Diverse presentations of the automaton throughout the early twentieth century, 
then, all participate in this conversation despite the varied natures of the created beings in 
these texts. If modernism is seen as a rupture in or questioning of the narrative of 
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progress, the automaton may stand for the conflicting and indeterminate reactions to this 
break from the familiarity of tradition or institutions. This simultaneous presence of the 
homely and unhomely/familiar and unfamiliar in modernism’s conception of the present 
moment is illustrated by the automata of each of the texts examined here. 
 Regardless of whether the automaton in question is constructed of clockwork, 
organic material or repurposed human limbs; whether the creature feels pain, speaks, or 
advocates for its own rights, the reader’s knowledge that this familiar human body is 
simultaneously unfamiliar and threatening in some way to his understanding of 
“humanity” evokes a sense of fear or doubt. The automaton stands in for some greater 
anxiety—personal or societal. This foil allows literature to take on a unique meaning-
making function as it allows for a snapshot view into otherwise unpublicized—if not 




ČAPEK’S UNIVERSAL AUTOMATON 
One such example of the automaton’s ability to stand in for and condense 
multiple societal and/or personal preoccupations is another modernist text that treats the 
automaton: Karel Čapek’s R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), which emerged on the 
theater scene in 1921. European theater had shifted to reflect the anxiety of the times, and 
one exploration of the dehumanization of both industry and society at large was through 
the trope of the automaton, which R.U.R. introduced to a new audience. R.U.R., which 
was famously the play in which the word “robot” was first introduced, also served as a 
vehicle for the exploration of societal anxiety, both in the 1920s and in retrospect. As 
Paul Menard’s article “I Am Your Worker/ I Am Your Slave” explores, the technological 
advances of the early twentieth century were clearly reflected and expanded upon in the 
theater scene. A European public increasingly unsure about their status and autonomy in 
a changing world—in the mechanization of industry, the expansion of distance-warfare 
and the liberalization of the global economy—questioned their necessity for continued 
industrial production and military action.  
European theater shifted to reflect the anxiety of the times: “Like the systematized 
action of the factory assembly line, this important shift is consistent with the perceived 
loss of individual autonomy and the lack of agency in the face of increasingly complex 
networks of economic, social, and political power during the early twentieth century” 
(Menard 121-22). One such vehicle for exploration of this lack of agency was the trope of 
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the automaton, which Čapek’s R.U.R. introduced to an audience faced with different 
concerns and preoccupations than readers of Shelley. 
R.U.R., which is set on the remote island/factory of the Rossum’s Universal 
Robots corporation, explores the dilemmas posed by the factory production of thousands 
of flesh-and-blood “Robots,” which the eccentric character of Old Rossum has created 
from a mysterious biological substance. These Robots are nearly indistinguishable from 
human beings, except for their lack of emotion and soul. Young Rossum, interested in the 
corporation’s bottom line, later tinkered with the Robots and removed these two 
problematic, human features in order to be able to efficiently mass-produce the machines 
to be sold worldwide in place of human labor. He does, however, grant the Robots the 
ability to feel pain in the form of the “Robot’s cramp” so that they may be punished. As 
might be predicted, these modifications inexplicably go awry and some of the Robots 
seem to acquire personality and emotion,  
Over the course of ten years, the Robots begin a global takeover, first of 
production and manufacturing, and then in the form of a deadly military coup. Their 
leader demands the extermination of all humans and eventually taking the island (and, 
presumably, the world) from their former masters in what might seem to be a direct 
parallel of both the industrial and political turmoil of Čapek’s post-World-War I 
Czechoslovakia. The Robots stand in as menacing agents of change and the diminished 
necessity for human labor and independent governance. 
Yet the plot of R.U.R. is complicated by the uncanny, evolving humanity of the 
Robots. During the takeover, the formula used to create Robots from Old Rossum’s 
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mysterious biological element is destroyed. Though most Robots were designed to be 
unfeeling, inhuman laborers, certain Robots appear to have developed the ability to 
empathize with and love each other. In order to stave off certain extinction, the modified 
Robot Primus offers himself in place of another Robot, his love interest Helena, to be 
dissected in an attempt to continue their species. In the play’s strange finale, the last 
surviving human declines to dissect either living Robot and instead sends these two 
apparently-humanized lovers out to reproduce naturally, in the style of the first humans 
and with the quasi-Biblical charge to “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the 
earth…Our [human] buildings and machines will fall to ruin, the systems and the names 
of the great will fall like leaves, but you, love, you flourish in the ruins sow the seeds of 
life in the wild.” The automata then become the last hope for the continuation of 
humanity, and the play’s final line is the final human exclamation “life will not perish!” 
The reader is thus left in a state of intellectual uncertainty about the humanity of Čapek’s 
Robots. 
The reader’s inability to categorize Čapek’s automata may echo Freud’s 
understanding of the uncanny automaton, but the playwright also utilizes the Robot to 
contribute to a different conversation in the international literature of the automaton. 
These creations, which have in the course of three acts destroyed all but one human being 
across the globe, are simultaneously unfeeling murderers and empathetic lovers. The 
Robot is both an emotionless machine that desires dominance and a flesh-and-blood 
creature that craves freedom from oppression. While most scholars of the play have 
examined the Robots as a direct response to specific regional events and disruptions in 
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the author’s time, it is possible to instead read them as a destabilizing reaction to more 
universal modernist concerns about technology and the body, encapsulated in the self-
reflexive figure of the automaton.  
The play’s many critics explore specific possibilities for the ways in which this 
text corresponds with the author’s situation. Menard focuses on the playwright’s location 
in turbulent post-war Czechoslovakia; although the narrative is set on a remote, “global” 
island, the bellicose themes that Čapek explores seem particularly relevant to the 
preoccupations of the author’s particular region, and the play, according to Menard, is “a 
product of post-World War I Czechoslovakia and its unstable political environment, 
combined with the industrial modernization of the world at large…[the creative spark 
was] the anxiety Čapek faced from encroaching political, social, economic, and 
technological ‘advances’” (124-25).  
Čapek himself, however, was apparently tired of a similar speculative discussion 
about his play between three of his contemporary scholars. In 1923 he wrote a piece for 
The Saturday Review, entitled “The Meaning of R.U.R.,” which addresses the critical 
desire to locate a correspondence between specific national events and ideologies and 
R.U.R.. In this short article, the playwright begs the vanity of saying a few words to 
correct the speculation about the robots—the created men—and to shift the focus of 
discussion. Čapek discusses the characters of Old Rossum and Young Rossum, as well as 
each man’s intended motivations for creating an artificial man. Each of the supporting 
characters is motivated by a different emotion: desire for liberation from hard labor, 
disdain for technology, desire to modernize, fear of the robots themselves. Čapek 
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acknowledges that it is possible to see in each of these characters an ideology or a 
worldview that corresponds specifically to events, figures or ideologies within his 
contemporary global situation. However, he claims: 
We need not look for actual names for these various and controverted 
idealisms. Be these people either Conservatives or Socialists, Yellows or 
Reds, the most important thing is—and this is the point I wish particularly 
to stress—that all of them are right in the plain and moral sense of the 
word…I ask whether it is not possible to see in the present social conflict 
of the world an analogous struggle between two, three, five, equally 
serious verities and equally generous idealisms? (79) 
Čapek acknowledges the multitude of potential motivations and anxieties wrapped up in 
the themes and motifs of R.U.R. The uncanny and difficult to categorize automata, while 
they may correspond to regional events, are more than mere artifacts of regionalist 
literature or direct representations of the 1920s Czech political scene. The more global 
themes to which the Robots draw attention are also conversations that other modernist 
authors, vis-à-vis the figure of the automaton, are more complicated than an equation of 
the Robots with Soviet communist progress or mechanization. The larger motif of the 
automaton complicates a straightforward reading and takes into account the reader’s own 
complex reactions to the textual automaton, influenced by his own situation, concerns 




QUIROGA’S UNPOLICED AUTOMATON 
Quiroga’s deployment of the automaton is, like Čapek’s, indicative of universal 
societal pressures and anxieties that connect his text to the larger modernist movement. 
Quiroga certainly participated in the larger literary discourse of his time in stories that 
examine labor struggles, senseless death and intimidating technology, repurposing the 
themes and motifs of the literary modernism that flourished concurrently in Europe and 
the United States. One of Quiroga’s crucial contributions to the literature of the 
automaton was his depiction of the creation of human emotion through scientific 
experimentation. He examined science and technology’s impact on the human psyche, 
which is a common motif in modernist literature. Yet, because he treated these themes in 
a rustic, naturalist setting, Quiroga has been given the minimalizing label of “regionalist” 
or “creolist” (“Quiroga, Horacio 1878-1937”), which seems appropriate given the 
author’s dislike of cosmopolitan cities such as Paris or Buenos Aires and his eventual 
retreat to the Misiones region of Argentina and to settle the very jungles about which he 
wrote. While Quiroga is thus admired as a reclusive, reluctant author whose masterfully 
grotesque short stories displayed an ability to mimic the power of the great Western 
authors in a novel, South American setting, this categorization of Quiroga as imitator is 
demeaning to the author, who is a participant in the same global literary response to 
modernity as his contemporary authors.  
Critics such as George D. Schade and Jason Wilson have focused on Quiroga’s 
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dissociation from the literary trends of his contemporaries and have equated this with 
lack of political interest and agenda. By consciously choosing to imitate the short stories 
of Edgar Allan Poe with his own South American spin on the gothic short story, Schade 
claims, Quiroga turns away from the literary modernismo of his European contemporaries 
and shuns politics, although, in spite of this intentional distancing, “some of the most 
trenchant social commentary in Spanish American fiction can be perceived in his stories, 
particularly those concerned with the exploitation of Misiones lumberjacks, like ‘Los 
mensú’ (‘The Monthly Wage Earners’) and ‘A Slap in the Face’” (Schade). Wilson 
similarly discusses Quiroga’s derision for the “literary fashions” of his contemporary 
authors and his desire to create a story “written in blood” by using “Spanish that refused 
to be “polished” and literary, reproducing local speech, packed with specific plant and 
animal names, in an attempt to capture what [he] called ‘real life’” (Wilson).  
This motion to distance Quiroga from the styles of European literary modernism, 
however, equates that singular high or “aesthetic” form of literary modernism to the best 
writing of the period and discounts the artistry of Quiroga’s deliberate choice to reject 
modernist conventions. Few acknowledge any motivation behind this disdain for 
modernist “fashions” besides obstinacy or recalcitrance. Michael E. Wong-Russell does 
credit Quiroga with a deeper purpose for his break from modernism—promotion of a 
scientific mindset in both content and form: Quiroga is an author who attempted to 
escape from “rhythmic and metaphor-laden decorative verse to a prose/essay style that 
makes use of canonical and hypothetical scientific premises as its operatives” (93).  Yet, 
according to Wong-Russell, Quiroga is attempting to bypass his contemporary authors 
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altogether and transition into a form of literary naturalism, rather than participating in 
textual conversations between other authors.  
This argument echoes Beatriz Sarlo’s claim that El hombre artificial, like other 
Argentine futuristic fiction of the early twentieth century, was constructing a narrative of 
Latin American technological progress overcoming the region’s marginal status (71). She 
ultimately reads the text as a tale of Argentine scientific democratization and locates the 
author at the beginning of a generation of Latin American authors who optimistically 
attempt to present rational, positive uses of science (71). Sarlo points to El hombre 
artificial as the novella that jumpstarted “the process by which the hegemony of the 
‘knowledge’ of science in Argentine literature and culture makes room for the ‘know-
how’ of technology and engineering” (8). This democratization, she claims, was mirrored 
by Quiroga’s motion to bring scientific literature to the masses through his accessible 
scientific language and the serial publication of the novella in a popular magazine. While 
these critics credit Quiroga with advancing the narrative of Argentine progress—whether 
technologically or in literary form—they focus on the author’s rejection of European 
literary modernism in favor of a “gritty and bloody” or “naturalist” Latin American style 
of writing, heavily influenced by Poe or Maupassant, instead of attending to his treatment 
of universal, modernist themes in a Latin American setting.  
The number of occurrences of automata exploded in modernist literature, perhaps 
because of the era’s preoccupation with the human body and the threats imposed upon it 
by a changing global situation. The human body served as the locus of modernism and 
technology in many texts—the point at which literature is forced to investigate and 
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address, if not assimilate, multiple reactions to technology. Tim Armstrong’s cultural 
study Modernism, technology and the body suggests that “modernists with quite different 
attitudes to social and technological modernity saw the body as the locus of anxiety, even 
crisis; as requiring an intervention through which it might be made the grounds of a new 
form of production” (4). This fundamental grounding point, which has served as both 
muse and subject matter for literature in every historical time period, was by the 
twentieth century a familiar avenue for literary exploration. While the nature of threats to 
the body certainly evolved over the centuries—the automaton in Mary Shelly’s 1818 
Frankenstein addressed different societal fears than the automaton in Quiroga’s 1910 
novella—the motif of the automaton connected centuries of literature in a shared 
tradition.  
The “human” body that interacts with technology in El hombre artificial—
represented in the vague forms of chemical analysis and creation, hypnotism, and 
electrical transference—is the perfect body of Biógeno. His freshly created form is a 
canvas that at once displays both the promising and horrifying potentials of technology’s 
impact upon human beings. On one hand the automaton is elementally perfect, having 
somehow been constructed on an atomic level:  
elemento por elemento, miligramo por miligramo, todo había sido 
prolijamente dosificado, probado y ejecutado…Tal increíble perfección 
habían puesto en los mas insignificantes detalles de su obra…El ser que yacía 
de espaldas frente de ellos era un hombre de  mediana estatura, de 
maravillosa proporción. Representaba veinticinco años. Las facciones tenían 
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una serenidad sorprendente. Los ojos estaban cerrados y el pecho subía y 
bajaba rítmicamente.  
 
[element by element, milligram by milligram, everything had been neatly 
dosed, tested and implemented...Such incredible perfection had been put into 
the most minute details of their work...The being that lay on his back in front 
of them was a man of medium height and wonderful proportion. He appeared 
to be twenty-five years old. His features had a surprising serenity. His eyes 
were closed, his chest rising and falling rhythmically. (Quiroga 34-35)] 
While Biógeno thus appears to be the ideal specimen of a twenty-five year old man in 
perfect health, his body’s interactions with technology are not limited to concise 
measurements and sterile, detailed construction. The scientists soon realize that their 
creation lacks the perception and human sensations that would allow Biógeno to rise 
above mere physical perfection to become a functioning human being. Once more, they 
apply science and technology to their creation’s body in hopes of endowing him with 
these attributes.  
 This time, however, the process is neither neat nor detached. In order to endow 
Biógeno with perception, they must torture the vagrant and transfer his pain into their ser 
vivo. Donissoff attempts to explain the scientific premise of the process, using detached 
language and third-party theorems to justify the production of a “highly acute current of 
pain” through torture. Biógeno, he claims, is like the coil in a battery: 
Si se enrolla un alambre aislado en un cilindro de hierro y se hace pasar por el 
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alambre una corriente eléctrica, el hierro se imanta. Si ese cilindro así 
dispuesto se introduce en el hueco de un carretel, sobre el cual se ha enrollado 
también otro alambre perfectamente aislado, sin comunicación alguna con el 
cilindro, la corriente eléctrica del cilindro pasa por influencia a la del carretel, 
pero centuplicada en energía. Esto es lo que se llama carrete o bobina de 
Rumkhorff. 
 
[If an electric current is passed through an insulated wire wound on an iron 
cylinder, the iron becomes magnetized. If that cylinder is then inserted into 
the hollow of a spool on which another perfectly insulated wire is wound, 
without any communication with the cylinder itself, the first cylinder’s 
electric current will be transferred through the influence of the spool, but the 
energy will magnify a hundredfold. This is what is called a Rumkhorff reel or 
coil. (Quiroga 37-38)] 
Armstrong claims that this metaphor of the human body as a battery, which may not seem 
significant to a twenty-first century audience, is actually a common motif in twentieth 
century examinations of the human body. Society’s truce with this relatively novel 
technology was then more precarious. Quiroga’s presentation of Donissoff’s attempt to 
justify his radical experiments through this metaphor thus situates the novella within a 
larger modernist conversation about the dangers of intimidating electrical technologies.  
 Armstrong points to the use of electricity and its changing status at the turn of the 
twentieth century as a device in modernist literature that was “becoming part of a 
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network of power which transcended the scale of the human body and could kill. Its 
mobile energies seemed like an index of modernity (particularly American modernity)” 
(14). He also points to Gerald Stanley Lee’s 1913 articulation of “[electricity’s] ability to 
connect the individual and the polis… this use of electricity to aphorize poet - as portable, 
networked, and rowing between individuals and the state…” (14).  
The dual nature of electricity in this period was the potential and danger inherent 
in its ability to allow individuals to transcend traditional hierarchical structures. The 
electric current forms a network that connects all individuals and thus democratizes 
society. In the modern period, electricity was seen as imitating the body’s neural, 
“electrical” impulses. Therefore the individual might be connected to others on equal 
footing, but would at the same time be vulnerable to the dangers associated with the 
human body’s interactions with electricity. This radical democratization vis-à-vis 
electrical connection was certainly an intimidating and concerning prospect for a society 
still much entrenched in a stratified, colonial system of both class and scientific 
education. 
Thus the electrical metaphor was used to explain the “dangers” of an 
interconnected, overly stimulating human network in both El hombre artificial and its 
contemporary literature. The modern era was an era of stimulation, and exposure to 
unrestrained or unpoliced technology was considered dangerous.3 The speed and 
                                                
3 Armstrong’s study references Theodore Dreiser’s masterful turn of phrase on the topic 
of technological fatigue and stimulation. Dreiser described it as: “a kaleidoscopic glitter, 
a dazzling and confusing phantasmagoria of life that wearies and stultifies the mental and 
moral nature. It induces a sort of intellectual fatigue through which we see the ranks of 
the victims of insomnia, melancholia, and insanity constantly recruited. Our modern 
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complexity of modern life was seen to produce the affliction of nervous exhaustion or 
“neurasthenia,” which was the most common psychiatric diagnosis of the late nineteenth 
century. This conception of the human body equated it to a battery, plugged into a society 
that, when directly connected without mediation, would drain it: “as the body is plugged 
into such external systems as the telegraph and railway, its energy needs rise” (Armstrong 
18). The fear that humans would, when presented with unpoliced and newly-
democratized technology, disconnect from the structured safety and moral guidelines of 
established society and do damage to themselves and others is clearly reflected in the 
gruesome result of the scientists’ electrical experimentation with their automaton in El 
hombre artificial.  
 Despite his attempt to couch the torture in sterile scientific language, Donissoff’s 
attempt to “charge” Biógeno with twenty-five years’ worth of sensation through the 
application of a stream of intense pain is messy and violent. Instead of his previous, 
“virginal” serenity, Biógeno’s body displays the crippling effects of the accumulation of 
pain and horror as each of the victim’s fingernails are removed with pliers. By the end of 
the process, his body bears unintended scars created by this application of technology, the 
tremors and grotesque expression of an adult who has seen and suffered horrors (Quiroga 
40).  
 Donissoff, however, refuses to accept that this grotesque and morally problematic 
quandary is anything other than a setback in the scientists’ grand experiment—something 
                                                                                                                                            
brain-pan does not seem capable as yet of receiving, sorting, and storing the vast arm of 
facts and impressions which present themselves daily. The white light of publicity is too 
white” (qtd. in Armstrong 22) 
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that can be adjusted through a reapplication of the same methods, slightly recalibrated. 
While Sivel and Ortiz urge him to put Biógeno out of his misery, Donissoff refuses to 
squander four years’ worth of scientific production, and leaves the automaton in agony 
overnight as he reevaluates the premise of the experiment. In the morning, the scientist 
declares his intent to reverse the process of accumulation of sensation, prolonging the 
experiment. He again attempts to couch torture in scientific language and to describe the 
process as a “discharge” of sensation from Biógeno into another “container.” Lacking a 
receptacle to fill this function, Donissoff offers his own body to receive the discharge. To 
his colleagues, the commitment of his own body to the scientific cause appears to be a 
noble sacrifice for the sake of scientific progress.  
 While the process itself is horrifying and gruesome, claiming the lives and dignity 
of both Donissoff and Biógeno, the novella’s conclusion seems to suggest that 
Donissoff’s commitment to scientific progress in the face of setbacks and moral 
limitations is to be admired as a sort of martyrdom. Donissoff is described as an 
archangel whose demise precludes any continuation of the experiment by the secondary 
scientists Sivel or Ortiz, neither of whom was willing to push the boundaries of morality 
in the same way that Donissoff had:  
Everything was finished! Never again would they aspire to anything! Never 
again would they enter the laboratory! Their entire future was dead now, 
like the man with the bandaged hands was dead; like their abominable 
creation was dead; like there lay dead—sublime creature, archangel of 
genius, will, and beauty—Donissoff (Quiroga 52).  
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In this final exclamation, the scientific project is mourned over and above the 
experiment’s casualties. The victim whose fingernails were pried out for the sake of 
science and the automaton whose potential and physical perfection were desiccated by 
the overambitious attempt to endow him with the totality of human perception are 
mentioned. Yet the actual outcry is for the death of possibility and the future that the 
three scientists had imagined for themselves—their amoral visionary, Donissoff, has 
perished and with him died the unpoliced drive towards scientific progress without 
attention to the laws of man or morality. 
This aspect of the text reveals a societal fear of the worst-case technological 
scenario: a realization of the fear that widespread, amateur access to science via 
technology could not be policed. Yet at the same time, the three scientists were able to 
make substantial developments in their fields that resulted in an impressive 
interdisciplinary collaboration. The three scientists’ attempt to create a human being 
speaks to the potential dangers of scientific knowledge being converted into mass-
produced, widespread technology available to all. Donissoff, Sivel and Ortiz may deserve 
praise for achieving their monumental discovery through only widely accessible 
technology. Yet the text goes on to encourage skepticism about the destructive potential 
of technology in unscrupulous hands in Quiroga’s revelation of the cost of this 
accomplishment, counted in dismembered human bodies. These three characters utilize 
their technological prowess without seeming to hold their experiments accountable to any 
code of conduct—or at least adhering to a moral code that would prohibit them from 
torturing another human being in order to give life to their creation.  
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Here Quiroga examines the implications of technology’s interactions with the 
body: does the exciting scientific possibility of creating sentience or knowledge out of 
pain justify torture? Haywood points to the disparity between the narrator and the 
victim’s perceptions of the three torturers: the narrator claims that “horrible era sin duda; 
pero para aquellos tres hombres que habían sacrificado a su ideal, uno su cariño de hijo, 
otro su amor, otro su fortuna, el tormento aplicado a un pobre ser inocente no podía ser 
obstáculo al triunfo de su ideal científico” [Doubtless it was horrible, but for these three 
men who had sacrificed all for their dream: one a son’s love, another his lover, the other 
his fortune, the torment of a poor innocent being could not be an obstacle to the triumph 
of their scientific dream.] (Quiroga 38). From the victim's perspective, however, the 
laboratory is described as “that laboratory with its hellish appearance, and the three 
demons, devourers of men” (Haywood 200). The purity of the scientists’ goal juxtaposed 
with the victim’s perception of these men as hellish demons exposes the Machiavellian 
conundrum that scientific progress is frequently forced to confront. The reader is forced 
to weigh the value of the experiment’s end result against the gruesome means by which it 
is obtained—the torture victim’s eventual death balanced against the myriad scientific 
advances that it could produce.  
This line of inquiry is further complicated by the figure of the automaton, 
Biógeno. The text certainly encourages its readers to consider whether the sacrifice of 
two human lives is worth an immense scientific gain and the acquisition of the god-like 
ability to create new human life. Yet that “essential paradox” is perhaps less paralyzing 
than what I believe is the real ethical quandary of the novella: the morality of torturing 
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the automaton in the name of science. While it is easy to decry the abduction and torture 
of the vagrant victim, or even the ultimately futile self-sacrifice of Donissoff’s life in the 
name of the experiment, these are both human lives. But what of Biógeno? He is no one’s 
son or brother, and did not have the human ability to feel until he was endowed with the 
sensation. He is essentially created in the same manner as a petri-dish culture or the 
scientists’ early experimental rat. Sivel, Ortiz and Donissoff seem to see the automaton in 
this manner, valuing not the being but the scientific breakthrough that he represents. They 
refer to killing the automaton as “ending the experiment” instead of murder, as in the 
death of the vagrant.  
The reader nonetheless sees humanity in the “perfect specimen.” Biógeno weeps, 
feels pain and exhibits other signs of humanity. As with Čapek’s robots, it is easy to 
sympathize with the automaton, who in El hombre artificial is both innocent and passive. 
The knowledge that this character is not actually human undermines this sympathy but is 
unable to fully overcome it. The confusion caused by Biógeno’s evocation of sympathy 
for human suffering, concurrent with his exploitation by Donissoff and company in the 
name of scientific progress produces a conflicting, and perhaps uncanny, reaction for 
both the morally divided scientists in the novella and the modern readers of Quiroga’s 
novella. 
Thus El hombre artificial is a text that participates in and contributes to a 
conversation that encompasses more than a regional Argentine perspective on 
globalization or a naturalist tradition that serves as precursor to magical realism or the 
Latin American boom. The framework provided by the greater context of international 
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modernism allows this novella to speak to transnational concerns and preoccupations. El 
hombre artificial reflects the multi-faceted nature of modernism’s reactions to technology 
through the complex figure of the automaton Biogeno, illuminating the conflict located in 





None of the three texts examined in this paper—Freud’s “The Uncanny,” Karel 
Čapek’s R.U.R., and Quiroga’s El hombre artificial—present a one-to-one 
correspondence between the figure of the automaton and a global event, leader or 
ideology. Even the possibility that the automaton directly reveals a single memory or 
neurosis in the individual reader’s subconscious seems to be precluded by the myriad 
occurrences and varying natures of the automaton in the convoluted and often abstract 
plots of the many modern texts that make use of the motif. Yet read in conversation with 
each other, each text contributes to an understanding of modernism that incorporates 
multiple regional or national perspectives on common themes.  
Quiroga does not attempt to present a single answer to—or even a single 
perspective on—the issue of human morality and responses to the newfound and 
relatively unrestricted power granted by modern technology. He instead locates his 
novella—with its Latin American setting, modern preoccupations and cosmopolitan cast 
of characters—within the global tradition of the automaton that can be traced back 
through thousands of years of literature. This established tradition, though generally 
studied in the context of nineteenth and twentieth century Western European literature, 
nonetheless provides a lens for examination of any number of diverse cultures and time 
periods. Quiroga’s novella, in its conversation with texts such as R.U.R. and “The 
Uncanny” that feature the automaton, transcends classification as a regional text 
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concerned only with distinctly Latin American issues. Instead, the reactions to the 
uncanny nature of the automaton presented in this novella are global reactions that reveal 
preoccupations of a transnational—not regional—modern era.  
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